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ISMAEL AGUILAR BARAJAS""

Interregional Transfer of Water in
Northeastern Mexico: The Dispute
over El Cuchillo***
Comments during the Binational
U.S.-Mexico Seminar's Session on
Coping with Scarcity in the Rio
Grande/Rio Bravo Drainage Basin:
Lessons to be Learned from the
Drought of 1993-1996
I. INTRODUCION

This article focuses on the recent conflicts over the transfer of water
between the northeastern Mexican states of Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas.
At the center of this controversy is E Cuchillo Dam (the Dam). The Dam
is located in a region of Mexico that is of strategic economic importance for
the entire Rio Bravo Basin, including these two Mexican states and the
southern part of Texas. Please refer to Maps I and 2 for an illustration of
this area. One of the crucial players in this dispute is Irrigation District 026,
which is located in Tamaulipas. This district is one of the largest and most
powerful districts in northern Mexico. The other key participant in this
conflict is the Metropolitan Area of Monterrey (Monterrey), which is
located in the state of Nuevo Le6n. This city is one of the most important
urban-industrial centers in the lower part of the Rio Bravo Basin and is
often considered to be the industrial capital of Mexico.
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The Dam is a multi-purpose project that was officially inaugurated
in October 1994 by President Salinas. It was constructed to supply drinking
water to Monterrey and to provide irrigation water to northern
Tamaulipas. The Dam is located in the state of Nuevo Le6n and was built
so that more water could be stored from the San Juan River before the river
emptys into the Gulf of Mexico. The water in this river primarily originates
in Nuevo Le6n. Originally, most of the water from the San Juan River was
stored in the Marte R. G6mez Dam, which is located in the state of
Tamaulipas, downstream from El Cuchillo Dam. The water from this dam
was primarily used to satisfy the agricultural needs of Irrigation District
026. The construction and operation of El Cuchillo Dam and a severe
drought have decreased the water available to Irrigation District 026.
Consequently, this reduction in water has compromised the District's
ability to produce its crops. In addition, the negotiations involved in
constructing the Dam were not entirely inclusive of the farmers in
Irrigation District 026. These factors have helped to create an ongoing
conflict between Monterrey, Irrigation District 026, the Mexican federal
government, and the state governments of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n.
The article written by Dr. Octavio ChAvez on this subject appropriately sheds light on the more visible and recent aspects of the El Cuchillo
conflict. His article also identifies the conflicting needs associated with
providing enough water for the growing urban and industrial sector in
Monterrey and the growing rural and agricultural sector in Irrigation
District 026. In order to understand this complex interstate problem better,
however, this subject needs to be discussed in a more comprehensive
context. This article, therefore, first develops the history and context in
which El Cuchillo Dam was built and discusses how the controversy
developed. Then, recent solutions to the conflict are discussed along with
the varied and profound policy implications that these current solutions
engender.
These solutions utilize many different disciplines such as economics, politics, and water law. The most crucial resource available to resolve
this conflict is having a firm understanding of the history of the conflict. All
resolutions and policy implications must necessarily flow from this
understanding.

I.

THE CONTEXT OF THE DISPUTE

A. El Cuchillo Has Been A Long-Standing Project
Although El Cuchillo Dam was officially inaugurated in 1994, and
the conflict between Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n did not intensify until
1996, its construction has been discussed for at least seventy years. In fact,
a study of the Comisi6n Nacional de Irrigaci6nin 1940 indicates that plans

Winter 1999]

THE DISPUTE OVER EL CUCHILLO

were being developed as early as 1923 to develop ways to capture more of
the water from the San Juan River before it empties into the Gulf of Mexico.
Along these lines, governmental officials studied whether two proposed
reservoirs, known as E Cuchillo Dam and El Azicar Dam, should be built.
For the next few years, governmental officials wavered between
building El Cuchillo Dam versus building El Azdcar Dam. In 1931
governmental authorities decided to build El Azdcar Dam. In July of 1934,
however, this decision changed and those in charge decided instead to
build El Cuchillo Dam at China, Nuevo Le6n. The primary reason for this
shift in policy was that agricultural land in northern Tamaulipas could be
irrigated more easily with waters from the Rio Bravo if El Cuchillo Dam
was built. Construction of this dam, however, was contingent on the
successful completion of negotiations between Mexico and the United
States. In order to facilitate these negotiations, the Bajo Rio San Juan
Commission was created.
With this structural framework in place, governmental officials
again changed their minds and decided that El Azdcar Dam should be built
instead of El Cuchillo Dam. The reason for this change was that El Cuchillo
Dam would only have the capacity to irrigate 25,000 hectares of land
upstream from Ochoa, which is near El Azicar. El Azdcar Dam, however,
could serve around 60,000 hectares of land. The capacity of water to be
used for irrigation from El Azdcar Dam was figured to be approximately
700 million cubic meters (Mm3 ). The total capacity of the Dam, however,
was to be about 2,100 Mm3 . The idea to supplement water stored in El
Azdcar Dam with water from the Rio Bravo was abandoned, and personnel
previously assigned to the El Cuchillo project were actually removed from
China, Nuevo Le6n, and sent to Camargo, Tamaulipas, to begin building
El Azdicar Dam. El Azfcar Dam, later named the Marte R. G6mez Dam,
began operating in 1943.
As history now shows, the El Cuchillo project did not materialize
for another five decades. Even after negotiations began with regard to
construction of the Dam, there were still technical discussions as to
whether it was better to have one dam instead of two. Economically
speaking, it would be cheaper to make due with one dam. Government
officials, however, favored having two dams because this would enable
optimal use of the water from the San Juan River.
Initially, the main rationalization for building El Cuchillo Dam was
to supplement the irrigation needs of northeastern Tamaulipas. This
rationalization was later expanded to encompass the growing need of
Monterrey to augment its supply of drinking water. In addition to these
justifications, building El Cuchillo Dam would also help minimize flood
damage caused by the Rio San Juan. Even though El Cuchillo Dam was not
built at this time, it continued to be contemplated by many officials as a
future solution for the time when Monterrey's need for additional drinking
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water and both Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas' need for supplemental
irrigation water became cruciaL
Along these lines, a study was conducted in 1955 that reviewed
several regional sources of water. This study found that storing water from
the San Juan River would help solve Monterrey's growing water problems
even though building and utilizing El Cuchillo Dam would require a
longer distribution infrastructure.' No action was taken at this time,
however, to build El Cuchillo Dam.
The Warnings From Previous Studies
As discussed below, the construction of El Cuchillo Dam in 1994
went ahead against a known and potentially conflictive framework. To a
large extent; part of the problems with the Lower San Juan Basin, in
general, and El Cuchillo Dam, in particular, were already identified several
years ago. In other words, a great many of the problems that reached the
media in 1996 and 1997 had been present the very first day construction of
the El Cuchillo Dam began. In addition to the concerns contained in several
studies conducted during the 1970s and 1980s regarding the amount of
water that could be stored by building proposed reservoirs and the
corresponding amount of agricultural area that could be irrigated by
building such reservoirs, several technical reports also identified water
deficits in the Basin. A careful analysis of the existing conditions prior to
construction of El Cuchillo Dam suggests that the lack of vision in
attending to these conditions made the emergence of conflict over El
Cuchillo Dam an expected event.
In 1974, a study conducted by the Secretarfa de Recursos Hidrdulico
(SRH)2 reported that, regardless of the cost involved in building El Cuchillo
and its contributions toward rehabilitating the San Juan Irrigation District,
building the Dam would do more harm than good to the region. This study
concluded that, notwithstanding its contribution towards flood control of
the Rio San Juan, and its appeal as an option to augment Monterrey's water
needs, El Cuchillo Dam would reduce the amount of water available for
agricultural purposes in both Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n. This study
estimated that by building El CuchiUo Dam, 26,000 hectares of irrigated

1.

See ESTUDIOS Y PROYwos, A. C., EL PROBLEMA DEL AGUA DE LA CIUDAD DE

MONTERREY - CONTRMUCION ASU EsTUDO, at 6 (1955) (MEx, D.F.). It is interesting to note
that this study, along with others like it, also included the Rio Bravo as a source of water for
Monterrey. This has been a long-standing option for Monterrey. See also COMISION DEL PLAN
NACIONAL HIDRAULIco, SECrARlADE AGRICULTURAY Rtcuaw HIDRAULicos, INEGRA(N
DEL PLAN HIDRAULICO DE LA CUENCA DEL Rio BRAVO (1982) QvMco, D.F.).

2. SECRETARlA DERecuRsos HiDRAUO, REHABnrrACON DE Ls DIETR Os DE huGO DEL
BAJO RiO BRAVO (25) Y DEL Rio SAN JUAN (26), TAMAULIPAS-RESUMEN (1974) (Mdxico, D.F.).
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land located between El Cuchillo and the Marte R. G6mez reservoirs would
be added to the system in open competition with the areas already being
served.
In addition to this, the idea that the two major irrigation districts
in the Lower Rio Bravo Basin had artificially increased their water
allotments was gaining acceptance? When they were originally designed,
districts 025 (Lower Rio San Juan District) and 026 (Lower Rio Bravo
District) were programmed to have 60,000 and 160,000 hectares of
agricultural land, respectively. Due to political pressures, however, these
areas were increased to 71,535 and 247,587 hectares of land, respectively.
This means that the quantity of water initially allotted to these districts for
irrigation purposes was increased dramatically. To the extent that this is
the case, the water shortage problems that would occur twenty years later
had a firm root in this occurrence.
In 1976 another technical study, which simulated the functioning
of the entire Rio Bravo Basin, evaluated the feasibility of undertaking the
following four projects: Villalba Dam (on the Conchos River), E Cuchillo
Dam, Las Blancas Dam, and increasing the water storage capacity of the
Marte R. G6mez Dam on the San Juan River.4 Out of these four proposed
projects, the last three belong to the lower part of the Basin. This study
concluded that, due to the low volumes of water each of these projects
would contribute if completed, none of them could justifiably be built. The
study also concluded, however, that given the fact that water scarcity is a
limiting factor for further growth in the Basin, there could be a time in the
future in which any volume of water stored in the reservoirs would be
needed, regardless of the small amount stored and the expense involved
in constructing the reservoirs.5
Further research carried out two years later in 1978 concluded that
some of these reservoirs could be efficiently and economically used in the
lower part of the basin, but El Cuchillo remained the least attractivechoice,
either as an independent project or combined with others.' This research
noted that construction of a channel connecting the Falc6n Binational Dam
with the Marte R. G6mez Dam, and building El Cuchillo and Las Blancas

3. Mflxico, D.F., SNIsMA BANCOS DE COMERC0, LA ECONOMLA DEL ESTADO DE
TAMAULIPAS, COLECC1ON DE ESTUDIOS ECONOMIcO REGIONALES, INVEsTIGACION (U)

(1975)

(Mxco, D.P.).

4. JAIME C. SANCHO Fr. AL, SECRETARI DE REcuRSOS HIDRAUCOS, COMISION DEL PLAN
NACIONAL HIDRAULICO, DIRECCION GENERAL DE PLANEACION REGIONAL DIRECCION DE LA
ZONA NoRTE-MOELO DE SIMULACION DEL Rio BRAVO 11 (1976) (Mexico, D.F.).
5. See id., at 117.
6. See SECRETARIA DE AGPICULTURA Y RECURSOS HIDRAULICOS, ESTUDIO SOBRE EL
DE EXCEDENTES DEL Rio BRAVO, COAHUtLA, NUEVO LEON Y TAMAULIPAS,
INPRAEsmTUcIRA, RECURsOS YSERVicOS, S.C., at 24 (1978) (Mexico, D.F).
APROVECHAMIXI
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Dams would yield an extra 450 Mm3 of water. The interesting finding of
this study is that El Cuchillo Dam, independently, would only contribute
a very small volume of additional water. Upgrading the Marte R. G6mez
Dam and building Las Blancas Dam were both options that this study
preferred over constructing El Cuchillo Dam.
The reason for this is that the proposed site for building the El
Cuchillo Dam is located on the San Juan River. A great deal of the water
from this river, however, is already stored in the Marte R. G6mez Dam.
This means that in order to fill El Cuchillo Dam, water would have to be
taken from the Marte R. G6mez Dam. On the other hand, the proposed site
of Las Blancas Dam is on the Alamo River. The water from this river flows
into the Rio Bravo River, just a few kilometers downstream from Falc6n
Binational Dam. Due to this fact, the additional water available for storage
in Las Blancas Dam is much greater than the additional water available for
storage in El Cuchillo Dam. In fact, this report demonstrated that the
combined construction of the Las Blancas and El Cuchillo Dams would
mean that water stored in Las Blancas Dam would have to be used to
subsidize water stored in El Cuchillo Dam.
In discussing the rehabilitation plans for the two major irrigation
districts of the lower Rio Bravo Basin (Districts 025 and 026), this report
stressed that the problem was not only that the primary infrastructure
necessary for transportation and distribution of the water needed to be
improved, but also that operationand management water policiesfor the system
needed to be drafted. This finding is central to understanding the conflict
between Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n during the mid-1990s over El
Cuchillo Dam. If such policies had been drafted this conflict may have been
avoided entirely, or at the very least would have been minimized.
On the positive side, a study conducted by Sancho et. al, in 1976,
concluded that El Cuchillo Dam should be built even though it would be
expensive to build, would store a relatively small amount of water, and
would reduce the amount of water available for irrigation purposes.7 This
study viewed El Cuchillo Dam as a special case because of its ability to
supply additional drinking water to Monterrey. Thus, the Dam won
approval from this study on social rather than on financial terms. The
optimum conservation capacity of the dam was calculated to be 600 Mm3 .
Of this amount, the water that could be used by Monterrey for drinking
water was estimated to be about 150 Mm3 . Apart from urban/domestic
consumption, it was clear that the Dam was also going to be used to
irrigate agricultural land. This study also agreed with previous works,
however, and stressed that construction of El Cuchillo Dam would result
in a reduction of water available to irrigate agricultural land and would
7. See SANCHO mrAL, supra note 4, at 119.
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mean that 14,000 to 16,000 hectares of agricultural land would not be
irrigated.
This body of research made it very clear that any proposed
reservoir project would affect the functioning of the entire Basin in general
and especially the lower part of the Basin. Furthermore, the natural
hydrologic connections of the San Juan Basin to the Rio Bravo, and, thus,
with the United States in terms of the water accountability between the two
nations, also implied that the fortune of this tributary was of both national
and binational concern, and therefore was not just a local affair. Any new
water projects upstream from Amistad, especially involving the Rio
Conchos, would automatically imply a reduction in water availability in
the lower part of the Basin. In summary, the study ended by stating that
the evaluation of further development water projects in the region, of
course including El Cuchillo Dam, should consider political, social, and
economic aspects. Unfortunately it does not appear that the conclusions in
this study or the other studies mentioned above were taken into consideration twenty years later when El Cuchillo Dam was built.
In 1982, a study that simulated the functioning of the entire Rio
Bravo Basin discovered that there was a water deficit in the lower part of
the Basin.8 This study determined that the demand for water in this region
was 1,802 Mm 3, whereas the water supply in the region was only equal to
1,440 Mm 3. This means that there is a water deficit of approximately 362
Mm3 . Concerning irrigation, the study found that available irrigation water
for the two districts (San Juan and Lower Ro Bravo, or districts 026 and
025, respectively) was calculated to be 1,285 Mm 3 versus a water demand
of 1,434 Mm3 . The greatest deficit by far belongs to the San Juan Basin.
Altogether, water demand for the San Juan Basin, all users included,
amounted to 933 Mm3, resulting in a deficit of 465 Mm 3 .
To make things worse, this study also found, after simulating
future conditions, that available water for the lower part of the Basin was
going to be even less in the future. The likely extractions upstream of
Falc6n Binational Dam implied that water available for irrigation in the
lower part of the Basin would be reduced by 200 Mm3 . Furthermore, it was
found that for every additional three cubic meters being used in the higher
and medium parts of the Basin, there would be a corresponding loss of one
meter in the Lower Rio Bravo Basin. As for E Cuchillo Dam, its contribution, along with those of the then projected, but not built, Raices, Tunal,
and Chapotal Dams, it was calculated that an additional 880 Mm3 of water
would be available.

8.

COMISION DEL PlAN NACIONAL HIDRAUUCO, supra note 1.
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In their review of past possible sources to supply drinking water
to Monterrey, Loaiza Garcia and Jimenez Ram6n? found that most of these
sources were considered independently from each other, and that only the
technical availability of water was considered. In their view, the difficulties
involved in interregional transfers of water and the difficulties involved
with the applicable operation rules of the different reservoirs of the water
system were not adequately discussed. Based on this study, it is surprising
to note that neither the 1989/1990 agreements, nor the 1996/1997 accords
developed to resolve the dispute over El Cuchillo Dam, contained any clear
operating rules.
Factors and Activities Leading Up To Construction of El Cuchillo Dam
By the end of the 1970s the Ministry of Agriculture and Water
Resources recognized that supplying water to Monterrey for human and
industrial consumption was becoming increasingly difficult. Continued
drilling of new wells at greater depths was a means developed and utilized
to partially solve the problem. Still, these efforts could not keep pace with
population growth.
The new state administration of Nuevo Le6n (1979-1985) recognized that winning the battle for additional water was a matter of survival
for Monterrey. 10 President Josd L6pez Portillo stated in 1980 that supplying
drinking water to the city was a national priority. As a result, in 1980 the
Nuevo Le6n Water Plan was drafted. By the end of 1981, the need to search
for alternate water sources intensified because it was clear that Monterrey's
water deficit had been consistently increasing for several years.1 El
Cuchillo Dam, Falc6n Dam and Las Blancas Project Damn were some of the
proposed solutions to deal with Monterrey's water crisis.
A centerpiece of this plan was the construction of Cerro Prieto
Dam, which was officially inaugurated on July 27,1984, and was regarded
as "the project of the century." This dam was intended to satisfy the water
needs of Monterrey. A few years later, however, governmental officials

9. Remo Loaiza Garda &Arturo Jim6nez Ram6n, Aplicad6ndel Modelo de Asignaci6nde
Agua a Monterrey,Nuev Leon, INGENIERIA HIDRAUUCA EN MEXlco, Sept.-Dec. 1987, at 38.

10. See Horacio Salazar, El Agua que no Tenemos, in 1 LA ENCICLOPEDIA DE MONTERREY,
EL DIAIUO DE MONTERREY 347,416 (1.Cavazos Garza ed. 1996) (Monterrey, N.L.).
11. See Garcda & Ram6n, supranote 9, at 39.
12. The Las Blancas Project Dam was proposed to be built in Tamaulipas and would
capture waters from the Alamo River. This project has been contemplated for a long time as
a component of the proposed projects to resolve the current conflicts between Tamaulipas and
Nuevo Leon over El Cuchillo Dam. Both Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas have historically
believed that the Las Blancas Project would help alleviate Monterrey's water shortage, on the
one hand, and would augment the irrigation needs of northern Tamaulipas, on the other.
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discovered that, while Cerro Prieto Dam did help to alleviate Monterrey's
long-standing water deficit, it was not going to be a long-term solution for
the city due to prolonged droughts and continued population growth.'
In addition to constructing Cerro Prieto Dam, the Nuevo Le6n
Water Plan included the potential construction of three other dams, one of
which was El Cuchillo Dam. El Cuchillo was persistently considered to be
a major option for supplying drinking water to Monterrey. 4 Governmental
officials also discussed transferring water from the two international dams,
Amistad and Falc6n, for additional sources of water for Monterrey.
El Cuchillo was originally conceived as an integral approach to
water management, and was included in the Monterrey IV project. This
project had the following components:
* Constructing El Cuchillo Dam;
* Constructing a 102 kilometer pipeline from El Cuchillo Dam to
Monterrey;
" Increasing the capacity of San Roque Potabilization Plant;
" Improving distribution networks in Monterrey;
" Constructing treatment plants for residual waters;
" Enhancing the infrastructure in order to transfer treated water
to the Marte R. G6mez Dam through the Pesqueria River;
* Modernizing and automating the Monterrey water system; and
" Developing programs that controlled leaks and promoted
efficient water use.
An academic evaluation undertaken in 1993 suggested that from
a socio-economic perspective, Monterrey IV was worthwhile to pursue.15
But, of course, there were several methodological constraints and downstream impacts that were not considered. Once the dispute reached the
media, environmental impacts were seriously questioned. In November
1995, the United Nations conducted an ecological assessment of El Cuchillo
Dam, and concluded its assessment with serious concerns.16 When

13. See Salazar, supra note 10, at 421.
14. See id., at 422.
15. Elodina Guerra Dlvila, Andlisis Socio-Econ6mico del Proyecto Monterrey IV, at 32
(1993) (unpublished Economics thesis, Universidad Aut6noma de Nuevo Le6n, Monterrey,
N.L).
16. See Juan Dannel SAnchez, Las Agua de El Cuchillo Rasgen el Federalismo, EpocaSeminarioDe Mixico, Jan. 15,1996, 8, at 11 (Mdxico, D.F.). It has been extremely difficult to
access official reports on environmental impacts. The adverse environmental and socioeconomic impacts have been underlined by the Center for Border Studies and Promotion of
Human Rights (CEPPRODHAC, in Spanish) in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. Among these
environmental and socio.economic impacts are an increase in the number of wells drilled in
the region, a deterioration of agricultural and other economic activities, a growth of
unemployment and underemployment, an increase of health problems, a significant
migration to other regions of Mexico and the United States, an increase of trans-border cross-
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President Salinas inaugurated El Cuchillo on October 17,1994, he, like most
people, knew little about how soon the context of his words would change
and how they would be taken in a negative way: "El Cuchillo Dam is a
project of Nuevo
Le6n and for Nuevo Le6n, which will solve its future
7
water supply."'
III. THE DISPUTE
The Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin and the Impacts of Droughts
Dr. ChAvez' article is a timely and relevant contribution to a
current Mexican controversy that must be resolved in order for Mexico to
continue its plans for regional water development. Unfortunately, this topic
has remained largely under-researched, so much so that many people have
the impression that conflicts over interregional transfers of water in Mexico
are almost non-existent. Of course, this is far from true. Documented cases
about this subject, however, are not easy to find. This is regrettable in light
of the lessons and experiences that could be derived if such research
resources existed. In Mexico, there have been, and there currently are, other
conflicts related to interregional/interuser water transfers.' Some of these
conflicts are found in Central Mexico regarding the transfers of water to
Mexico City from the neighbor state of Mexico, and the Rio Lerma
Santiago, which supplies water to Guadalajara through Chapala Lake.
There are also problems between Saltillo, the state capital of Coahuila, and
Arteaga, a municipality of the same state.'9

trafficking, and deterioration of various ecosystems. See CEFPRODHAC, IDB-Funded Dam

Sparks Water-Rights Dispute, Borderlines,at 9 (Mar. 1996).
17. Salazar, supranote 10, at 423.
18. See Buitr6n Hernindez, Poder Politico y Distribuci6n de Agua en el Valle de Mexicali:
El Caso de la Compafifa de Terrenos y Aguas de la Baja California, S.A. (1917-1929) (1996)
(unpublished thesis, Universidad Aut6noma Metropolitana, Mexico, D.F). Mr. Henmdez
briefly describes several water conflicts in Mexico, with special emphasis on the political
power and water distribution in the Valley of Mexicali during 1917 to 1929. He provides a

good treatment of the growing role of the federal government over water management. See
also the bulletins published by the Archivo Historico del Agua (Historic Water Archive), in
which there are several stories about various water conflicts in Mexico. See, for instance, the

issues for September-December 1994 and 1995. The Archive itself houses an excellent library.
19.

In this case, negotiations are under way that would enable Saltillo to use this water

for its domestic and industrial growth. However, some estimates suggest that this would
cause a loss of agricultural output, mostly potato-related, of around 65 million dollars. The
interesting thing here is that the adverse socio-economic impacts would also affect the rural
areas of Galeana, a neighbouring municipality in the state of Nuevo Le6n. This is an

illustrative example of inter- and intra-regional (and inter-state) water impacts. Water supply
to Saltillo is already a critical concern. The city is part of the Saltillo-Ramos Arizpe Auto

Corridor, which has been referred to as the "Mexican Detroit." Many companies in this region
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There have also been other water conflicts within Nuevo Le6n.
After analyzing these conflicts, it is clear that water control and water use
in semi-arid regions not only engender controversy, but also are determining factors for economic expansion. In Olvera Sandoval's work,2 in which
he discusses the water conflicts in northeastern Mexico during the last
century, he states that in arid regions where water is scarce, the sociopolitical elements linked to irrigated land are rarely taken into consideration. As discussed later in this article, this is still the case at the end of the
twentieth century. Mr. Sandoval's work shows that when water is scarce,
economic activity is reduced. It is interesting to note further that historical
disputes over water also center around balancing the need for water of
agricultural and rural areas on the one hand and industrial or serviceoriented areas and cities on the other. Looking at history does help to see
water conflicts in a more dynamic way, instead of considering them as a
static event. The case of El Cuchillo Dam further supports this claim.
The latest drought has significantly added to the dispute over El
Cuchillo Dam, especially in light of the fact that the region is arid. Along
these lines, the Nuevo Le6n government recognized in a press release that
the drought had been the initial generator of the problem, and furthermore,

take water availability for granted and construct their businesses without considering the
local water supply. Those companies that do take water availability into consideration do not
construct their businesses in locations where water supply is an issue. Water availability in
this light becomes a serious determinant of regional competitiveness. See EL NORTE, Feb. 2,
1996, at 4A for more information on the rural versus urban conflict.
20. These conflicts refer basically to two spheres.The first has to do with water
management in Monterrey. From 1909 to 1945 water services were operated by a Canadian
firm. In 1945, after long legal conflicts, the city took control of the city's water services. See
Nicholhs Duarte Ortega, La Estatizacid6ndel Agua en Monterrey, in MONTERREY-SIETE ESWuDIOS
CONTEMPORANEos 181, 192 (Mario Cerutti ed., 1988) (Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n, M#xico,
Universidad Aut6noma de Nuevo Le6n). From 1954 to 1977 Grupo Monterrey, a powerful
group of businessmen, controlled the operation of water services, but lost it in a fierce battle
with the federal and state government. See Vivienne Bennett, Servicios PIblicos Urbanosy
RANEO, supra,
Conflicto Social:El Agua en Monterrey, in MONTERREY-SIETE ESIIOS CON
at 211, 214. The second sphere refers to water disputes in the citrus region from 1820 to 1970.
See Veronika M. Sieglin, Ejidos: Entre [a Acumulaci6n y la Descapitalizaci6n-ElCentro Sur de
Nuevo Leon (1950-1970), in PRODUCcION, EJIDOS Y AGUA IN EL NORESTE DE M9XICO 13, 27
(Mario Cerutti ed., 1994) (Monterrey, N.L., Universidad Aut6noma de Nuevo Le6n, M.xico);
VERONIKA M. SIEGLIN, MONTERREY, NUEVo LEON, CLAVES LATINO AMERICANAS AND
UNIVERSIDADAUEONOMA DE NUEVO LEON, LA DSPUTA POR EL AGUA EN EL NORESTE DvMbico

(1820-1970) (1995); Josd Antonio Olvera Sandoval, Linares Durante ia PrimeraMitad del Siglo
XIX-Propiedad, Riego y Conflictos Sociales en el Noreste de M6xi, in PRODUCCION, EJIDOS YAGUA
EN EL NORESTE DE Mflxco, supra, at 151; RomAn R. Rodriguez, Legislaci6n sabre el Agua y
Conflictos Intermunicipales en el Siglo XIX, in AGUA, TIERRA Y CAPITAL EN EL NORESIE DE
MexIco-LA REGION CrrRtcoLA DE NuEvo LEON 99 (Mario Cerutti ed., 1991) (Monterrey,
Nuevo Le6n, Universidad Aut6noma de Nuevo Le6n).
21. Sandoval, supra note 20.
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that the drought was regarded as the only common enemy between Nuevo
Le6n and Tamaulipas.' In this bulletin, the state government further
expressed its regrets that the transfer of water from El Cuchillo Dam for
Monterrey, and the subsequent transfer of treated waters from Monterrey
to Tamaulipas had not been enough to cover the needs of Irrigation District
026 in Tamaulipas.
Data directly released from the Water Commission indicates that
in 1994-96 the two binational dams, and also the Marte R. G6mez Dam,
had the lowest water levels in 15 years.' The effect that the low water
levels had on the region is illustrated extremely well by looking at the
productivity of the farmland in Irrigation District 026. From 1989 on, the
District was rarely able to irrigate greater than 40,000 hectares of its
farmland. Furthermore, irrigation plans for 1998 estimate that there will
only be enough water to supply one-third of the District's total farming
area with water.
Times of crisis, however, present opportunities to develop
alternative water-management options. Along these lines, governmental
rules and regulations could be developed that prioritize the demand for
water according to the importance of each specific water use. Likewise,
technological advances could also be developed and utilized to make water
use more efficient. Furthermore, a free-market system could be developed
to help allocate water efficiently according to its most beneficial use. For
these changes to be successful, however, the legal and institutional
framework regarding the regulation of water would have to be modified
significantly.
Currently, the agricultural industry uses the most water. Because
of this, any changes in the water usage of the agricultural industry would
have a great impact on the overall management of the Basin as a whole,
and particularly on the region affected by the current dispute over El
Cuchillo Dam. Of course nearby cities, and especially Monterrey, use a
great deal of water and have a significant role in this drama. Our estimates
indicate that Monterrey will have a population of 3.4 million by the year
2000 and above four million by 2010. This metropolis is likely to grow to a
population of 5.2 million in 2020 and grow to house an additional million

22. Press communication, Jan. 14,1996.
23. On October 27,1997, these reservoirs had the following capacities: Amistad, 1813.56

Mm 3 (out of a total conservation capacity of 4,137.20 Mm 3); Falc6n, 579.66 Mm3 (out of a
conservation capacity of 3,275.50 Mm); Marte R. G6mez, 211.70 Mm3 (out of a conservation
capacity of 924 M"); and El Cuchillo, 262.14 Mm 3 (out of a conservation capacity of 1023.04
Mm). These capacity amounts represent, vis4-vis total conservation capacities, the following
percentages: 43.8, 17.7, 22.9, and 25.6. This data was obtained by the author via personal
communication.
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people by 2030.1 Whatever Monterrey's population figures end up to be,
it is clear that further economic and urban growth in this city will increase
the demand for water in a basin whose water supply will likely decline.
Dr. Chlvez' discussion on the impacts of Monterrey's projected
population growth on the amount of water that will be available to
irrigation districts sounds promising, and introduces useful and interesting
elements, but could have been developed further. For example, more detail
is needed regarding the socio-economic effects that the present drought is
having on the region and on Irrigation District 026 in particular.
Inter-state Conflict
Two agreements were signed, one in 1989 and the other in 1990, so
that construction of El Cuchilto Dam could begin. The agreement signed in
1989 was signed by governmental officials of Nuevo Le6n and the Mexican
government. The second agreement, signed in 1990, was signed by
governmental officials of Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas, the National Water
Commission (the Water Commission) and other appropriate federal
governmental agencies. This agreement enabled Monterrey to receive
water from El Cuchillo Dam for human consumption, as long as the needs of
Irrigation District 026 in Tamaulipas were also satisfied. Unfortunately, a
severe drought occurred in this region, and, coupled with low water levels
in the Falc6n Binational Dam, compromised the success of El Cuchillo Dam
and intensified the controversy surrounding the Dam.
Considering the above events, late in 1995 the state of Tamaulipas
began to pressure the Water Commission, and through it the Mexican
government, to give it water from El Cuchillo Dam. On November 28,1995,
the Water Commission announced that it had committed water to
Irrigation District 026. On December 7, 1995, the Tamaulipas State Office
of the National Water Commission announced that over 160 million cubic
meters of water were going to be released from El Cuchillo to Irrigation
District 026. This announcement reflected a great deal of political pressure
and negotiations between the state governments of Tamaulipas and Nuevo
Le6n, and the federal government.
Then, on January third the Governor of Tamaulipas announced
that water from El Cuchillo Dam would be released. In making this
announcement, the Governor was referring to an agreement made in a
previous meeting held in Mexico City (December 17), in which Nuevo Le6n
had also been present. This announcement caused a great deal of unrest

24. These projections were made by the Nuevo Le6n State Population Council for the
Monterrey Tech-Houston Advanced Research Center (ITESM-HARC) research project on
sustainability in the lower part of the Rio Bravo Basin.
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and may have been the event that prompted Governor Rizo to assure that
Nuevo Le6n would not release a single millimeter of water.'
After public and private negotiations between the Water Commission and the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n, the Water Commission
used its legal authority to release water from the Dam to Irrigation District
026 in Tamaulipas on January 5,1996. Nuevo Le6n challenged the Water
Commission's decision to release water to Tamaulipas and secured a
judicial order that barred the Water Commission from releasing more
water to Tamaulipas until the situation was studied fully. Regardless of the
judicial decree, the Water Commission ordered on January 20, 1996, that
the gates of the Dam be reopened, and that 200 Mm3 of water be released
to Tamaulipas.
What is not clear in these events is the secrecy with which some of
these negotiations were conducted. The clandestine nature of these events
was known when the press reported the conflict. Even the media was more
interested in selling the news than in addressing in a more substantive way
the real issues under consideration. Perhaps this high degree of misrepresentation of the facts was, at least partially, responsible for the bad
treatment the Director-General of the Water Commission was given when
he came to Monterrey to announce the decision to release water from El
Cuchillo Dam to Irrigation District 026.2
These actions, in turn, led to many difficulties, reactions, and
problems that have continued on into 1997 and have involved federal and
state authorities, the private sector, senators and members of congress, and
civil organizations. In early January 1997, the farmers of Irrigation District
026 in Tamaulipas sued the federal government, the state governments of
Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n, and other governmental entities on the
grounds that the agreements signed in 1989 and 1990 giving Nuevo Le6n
rights to the water stored at El Cuchillo were unlawful. This suit was
unsuccessful. On October 27,1997, the court ruled that when the 1989 and
1990 accords were accepted, the 1952 Presidential Agreement, which
granted the farmers the right to use the water flow upstream of the Marte
K.G6mez Dam, was automatically abolished. The court further held that
water laws, adopted in 1972 and 1992, rendered the 1952 accord ineffective.
To complicate matters more, approximately 95 Mm3 of water was
released to Irrigation District 026 from El Cuchillo Dam, on November 13,
1997. It is no wonder that this controversy has remained unsolved
throughout 1998. Unfortunately, in the absence of a long-term, win-win

25. From a cynical perspective, some people argued that Governor Rizo was right and

that the release was for 200 Mm 3 of water, not for a millimeter of water.

26. He was seriously insulted and had to leave from the hotel's back door on January 5,

in order to be protected from angry protesters.
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agreement for both sides, it is extremely likely that the conflict over who
gets to use the water stored in El Cuchillo Dam will continue to cause
social, political and economic unrest.
Comments on the Paper Presented by Octavio ChAvez
As Dr. Chavez points out, construction of El Cuchillo Dam has
enabled more water from the San Juan River to be stored prior to emptying
into the Gulf of Mexico. As a result, more water is now available to meet
the growing needs of the region. If the waters from the Rio San Juan had
been included in the 1944 International Treaty with the United States, this
conflict would have been even more complicated. But, in a way, El Cuchillo
Dam has affected, even if indirectly, the binational management of water
resources between the United States and Mexico. In fact, it was after Texas
refused to lend water to Mexico, in a request from President Zedillo to
Governor Bush, that Tamaulipan farmers set their sights on the water
contained in El Cuchillo Dam.
It is also important to emphasize that the conflict did not start
when the Dam project was going to be implemented and regional waters
were to be shared. The problems that were seen during the mid-1990s (and
onwards) began with the project itself. To the extent that this is the case,
this would highlight the crucial relevance of policy formulation. Another
comment on the original presentation of Dr. Chavez' article is that in
addition to the reasons he puts forth to explain how the treated water did
not reach downstream farmers, there were a large number of illegal intakes
within the borders of both Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n. This proved to be,
and still is, a difficult political issue to deal with.'
As Dr. ChAvez emphasizes, the 1989 and 1990 agreements between
Tamaulipas and Nuevo Le6n did not include clear details as to how the
agreements would be effectuated. However, as already discussed,
Tamaulipas was not included in the drafting and negotiations of the first
agreement. Somehow, the discussion of the conflict in the media and a few
other sources took for granted, perhaps without actually having seen the
accords (especially the one for 1989), that this latter agreement explicitly
involved Tamaulipas and that the agreement had been signed by this State.
This is far from true. These agreements, however, deserve a more
substantive treatment than that given by Dr. Chivez. In fact, these

27. In the beginning of the controversy, the Nuevo Le6n government complained that
the Marte 1K G6mez Dam was not receiving Monterrey's treated effluent because of illegal
water intakes taken by Tamaulipan farmers. It was discovered later that there were also
farmers in Nuevo Le6n who were illegally pumping water from the watercourse. This, of
course, severely undermined the allegations made by Nuevo Le6n.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

agreements are the reason that El Cuchillo Dam was built. In order for the
Dam to be built, negotiations took place so that the 1952 Presidential
Accord, which gave Irrigation District 026 the right to use waters upstream
from the Marte R G6mez Dam, was put aside. As indicated above, this was
precisely the fundamental legal ground used to deny the Tamaulipan
farmers in their legal battle against Monterrey. This is widely acknowledged even by some of the farmers themselves.
In addition to the three types of primary arguments given by each
side and that are described by Dr. ChAvez, there were also social, environmental, and political arguments.' It is true that in the beginning Nuevo
Le6n stated that it had to pay for the Dam and thus that the water in the
Dam belonged to Nuevo Le6n. Of course, it was discovered later that the
federal government had actually paid for the Dam, while Nuevo Le6n had
only financed the new distribution system and the improvements made to
the existing one, as well as the construction of treatment plants. As Dr.
ChAvez highlights in his article, the economic valuation of the worth of
water tended to favor Nuevo Le6n's case, but also created serious doubts
about its accuracy. As should have been expected, the social impacts in the
rural areas of this inter-state transfer of water; impacts such as migration,
rising criminality, alcoholism, and family distress, along with the indirect
costs of foregone agricultural and livestock output; were never considered.
The agreement made on November 13,1996, only brought shortterm resolution to the dispute. This agreement, detailed in Dr. Chivez'
presentation, introduced more clarity to the dispute in some regards,
especially in determining the amount of water needed for Monterrey and
Irrigation District 031 (in Nuevo Le6n). However, almost every major issue
discussed so far requires a great deal of commitment, financial resources,
and political willingness to be resolved. This was demonstrated in 1997
when Nuevo Le6n failed to return the agreed 189 Mm3 of treated water to
Irrigation District 026. To rectify the situation, the federal government
agreed to pay, in February 1998, 15 million pesos to the farmers in
Tamaulipas, up from an original figure of 4 million pesos.
The statement made by Dr. Chavez' that conflicts over water rights
will continue is accurate. It is also true that the crisis over E Cuchillo Dam
did bring about some positive changes in the way water has been
considered. Originally, water was essentially regarded as a free good. Now,
28. Surely there were emotional concerns, but the elements given as such in the original
presentation this author was asked to comment on do not seem to belong to this category.
These emotional concerns have to do with how many inhabitants/users there are on each side
and the perception held by each side that the other side may be using excess mater. After all,
these issues should be seen more in the context of valuation methodologies for interregional
transfers of water. These issues have to do with the central question of valuation techniques
because they touch upon the various values of water for different users.
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however, there are some conservation measures taking place. For example,
the rural areas affected by this conflict are adjusting to it by shifting crops.
Greater efficiency seems to be the name of the game, but this has to be
applied in cities as well as in the countryside. The need for more comprehensive long-term planning and more appropriate valuation of water is
certainly a must Finally, it has been discovered that water management in
the Lower Rio Grande/Rfo Bravo Basin should really be considered to be
drought management.'
The El Cuchillo Dam Agreements
The 1989 agreement, signed in Monterrey on October ninth, was
the instrument that authorized the construction of El Cuchillo Dam. One
of the interesting things about this agreement, however, is that Tamaulipas
did not have a voice in the decision to build the Dam. The federal
government and the state of Nuevo Le6n made this decision. The purpose
of the agreement was to plan, construct, and operate the Monterrey IV
Project discussed above." Since El Cuchillo Dam was going to directly
affect downstream lands (and not only Irrigation District 026), it is hard to
understand why Tamaulipan farmers were not considered in the agreement. There also was no mention in the agreement of the 1952 Presidential
Accord, which granted Tamaulipas the right to use waters from the San
Juan River, upstream of the Marte R. G6mez Dam.'1
This seems to be a serious miscalculation, as history would show.
From first-hand personal contact with some of the Tamaulipan actors
involved, it appears that they had no knowledge of the existence of the
1989 agreement. Another salient issue of this Accord, which later did cause

29. This is evidenced by joint research undertaken by Temol6gico de Monterrey and the
Houston Advanced Research Center (project Water and Sustainable Development in the
Binational Lower Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin).
30. Originally, El Cuchillo was not going to be built as part of the Monterrey IV Project.
Instead, it was proposed that the Terreros Dam be constructed. This dam, however, could
only supply a small volume of water. This is why in 1987 the federal government and Nuevo
Le6n decided that it would be better to build El Cuchillo Dam. The name Monterrey IV is
taken from the fact that the loan for this project was the fourth of a series of loans obtained
by Monterrey from the Inter-American Development Bank. President Salinas acted as witness
of honor for the loan. Among the officials that signed the agreement were President Zedillo,
then Minister of Budgeting and Planning; the current Governor of Veracruz, then Minister of
Urban Development and Ecology; Jose Natividad Gonzalez Paras, then Secretary of the
Interior of Nuevo Le6n, and recently a candidate of the until then ruling party (PRI) to Nuevo
Le6n state government and who was defeated by Governor Canales, the current governor.
31. Even though, as it was going to be pointed out later, this 1952 Accord had been
automatically abolished by the 1972 Federal Water Law, this issue was to play a crucial role
during the dispute.
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a great deal of controversy, was the control of the Dam. It was agreed that
the Monterrey Water Authority, Servicios de Agua y Drenajede Monterrey
(SADM), would receive the water and would operate the water infrastructure, but not the Dam itself. The federal government, through the Water
Commission, would be in full command of the control and operation of the
Dam.
The Monterrey IV Project had the overall goal of providing water
to Monterrey, as well as aiding in water regulation in the lower San Juan
Basin and promoting socio-economic development along the El
Cuchillo-Monterrey corridor. This latter goal has rarely been mentioned
but it was in the agreement Total investments of the Monterrey IV Project
were estimated at 1.2 billion pesos at, then, market prices. El Cuchillo Dam
was thus built as part of a water program that was intended to end the
water deficit in Monterrey. In 1990 this deficit was estimated at 1,731 liters
per second (or 17 percent of demand). At this time it was common to find
water restrictions amounting to six to eight hours per day. The Monterrey
IV Program included several projects, as discussed above, in addition to the
Dam itself.
This is an important observation in light of the difficulties
encountered in fulfilling the 1990 agreement between Tamaulipas and
Nuevo Le6n that enabled the project to go ahead. The financing also came
from different sources, a point that proved to be a crucial one at the peak
of the dispute that is being discussed here. A great deal of misinformation
has entered into the debates, not only because the two major parties
claimed that they were entitled to water from El Cuchillo Dam, but also
because the issue of who really paid for the project came under great
scrutiny.
The 1990 agreement corrected some of the shortcomings of the 1989
agreement, but introduced others that proved to fuel more conflict. This
accord was referred to as a Special Coordination Program for Water Rights
along the San Juan River Basin. The central aim of this agreement was to
help satisfy water demands for urban and industrialuses in Monterrey and
to preserve water for various uses in Irrigation District 026 in Tamaulipas.
Under the workings of this accord, Monterrey would receive water from
El Cuchillo Dam at five cubic meters per second in the first stage and ten
cubic meters per second in the second and final stage. In return, the city
agreed to send water to the Marte R. G6mez Reservoir for Tamaulipas at
three cubic meters per second in a first stage and six cubic meters per
second in a second and final stage.
Some of the language in this agreement is confusing and ambiguous, a situation that would ultimately lead to more conflict and heated
32. See Divila, supra note 15.
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debate. Nuevo Le6n interests interpreted the language to their advantage
and Tamaulipan actors interpreted the language to benefit their interests.
The two states both appeared to be right and had legal reasons to support
their claims. Nuevo Le6n argued that according to Mexican federal water
law, human consumption had priority over any other use. Accordingly,
Tamaulipas made the case that this was correct as long as the water needs
of the farmers were not affected. The state governor went even further to
highlight the correct meaning of the word "preserve," and semantics then
dominated the debate for a while.
Missing from both arguments is the fact that the 1990 agreement,
signed by federal authorities and authorities from both states, explicitly
allocates the use of E Cuchillo Dam waters for industrial use as well. Many
people in Tamaulipas, however, are uncomfortable because they perceive
that Monterrey uses water from the Dam for industrial use. As far as the
official agreement is concerned, this possibility was left open and accepted
by the parties involved. Finally, the agreement does not contain language
that provides for a direct transfer of water between El Cuchillo Dam and
the Marte R. G6mez Dam, a situation that has in fact occurred in both 1996
and 1997. The document includes in its fifth clause, part (b), that the Water
Commission "commits itself to comprehensively operate San Juan River
Water Basin dams in order to guarantee present water volume use." The
only link with the actions to come may be within the term "comprehensively."
As the experience of six years later reveals, Monterrey would
indeed benefit from El Cuchillo Dam, but it was going to be very difficult
to completely honor established water rights in order to comply with the
spirit of the agreement. Some of the different clauses contained in the
agreement merit further discussion. The second clause indicates that the
board of directors of Irrigation District 026 had agreed upon the terms of
the agreement. In fact, some signatures were missing because some farmers
were opposed to the agreement. This division among the farmers still
remains. In addition, treated water was not returned either in quantity or
in quality, an issue that was touched upon again and again. Perhaps if this
commitment had been honored, the scale of the conflict would have been
reduced.
The fourth clause of the agreement included two issues that have
also been very difficult to address successfully. The first issue is that the
agreement stated that new water users of any kind that might negatively
affect Irrigation District 026's present water rights were not to be admitted
within the territory of the states of Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas. The other
issue centers upon the commitment to integrate a user census list for the
San Juan River and the Lower Bravo River irrigation districts and to set up
permanent surveillance to avoid new water mining from the river of any
kind whatsoever. In the sixth clause, Nuevo Le6n agreed to operate water
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treatment plants for sewage waters from Monterrey, in order to return
good quality waters to the Marte R. G6mez Dam, in accordance with
applicable federal sanitary and health regulations. Up to February 1998
there were still complaints in Tamaulipas that this quality was not good
enough. Another clause, which does not seem to have been successfully
implemented, is the seventh clause. According to their attributions, the
Ministry of Budgeting and Planning and the Federal Auditing Office are
supposed to carry out follow-up investigations, registration, control, and
evaluation of all actions, including financial resource applications. The
Ministry of Budgeting no longer exists, and it is not clear what agency has
taken over its responsibilities. The emergence of the E Cuchillo Dam
conflict is a key indication that these governmental agencies have failed to
meet their responsibilities to control and evaluate all actions in this matter.
The governor in Tamaulipas during this time was Americo
Villarreal Guerra, a former under-secretary of water infrastructure in the
federal Ministry of Water Resources. It surprised many people in
Tamaulipas that the governor had signed such an agreement because of his
previous experience as undersecretary. Since he was very knowledgeable
about water, many people believed that he was under severe pressure from
President Salinas to sign the agreement so that Nuevo Le6n could benefit
from construction of El Cuchillo Dam. It was well known, and highly
publicized, that President Salinas was very fond of the state of Nuevo Le6n.
In fact, he regarded himself as an "adopted son" of this state. Of course,
given the fact that Nuevo Le6n had to incur massive debt to build the Dam,
many question how fond he really was of Nuevo Le6n.
On January 21,1994, the Rio Bravo Basin Council was established
by a coordination agreement that was signed by the federal government
and the governors of the states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo
Le6n, and Tamaulipas. The Council was charged with developing a special
program to oversee the regulation and use of national waters and to ensure
that these waters are sanitary and used efficiently. The Council was also
created to provide a forum where stakeholders could have a greater say in
the management of water affairs. The El Cuchillo conflict should also be
seen within this context.
The El Cuchillo debate became very intense in 1996. As far as
Monterrey was concerned, almost every day there was news about the
conflict, and most of the time on the front page. Two primary ingredients
in this conflict were the presence of the drought and the effects El Cuchillo
Dam had in reducing water storage levels in the Marte R. G6mez Dam. The
obvious result of these factors was that the farmers from Irrigation District
026 sought to obtain water from El Cuchillo Dam, especially since Texas
had also denied them a water loan. The 1944 International Treaty was even
questioned. As mentioned above, this is an interesting situation, since there
was no explicit reference in the 1990 agreement that a direct transfer from
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El Cuchillo Dam to the Marte R. G6mez Dam could actually be completed.
As Dr. Chivez mentioned, Governor Rizo reacted to the request for water
from Tamaulipan farmers with an attitude that ultimately cost him his job.
Governor Rizo had already involved himself in several problems, but the
El Cuchillo affair certainly contributed to his decision to resign. For some
people in Tamaulipas, the best indicator of who was right or wrong over
this conflict was that Governor Rizo was asked to leave while Governor
Cavazos remained in office.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND THE 1997 AGREEMENT
The signing of the agreement on November 13,1996, however, was
not the end of the story. One year later El Cuchillo Dam was still in the
news. During 1996 each state governor, local authorities, farmers, and state
senators had registered concern. Large amounts of financial resources and
a great deal of political willingness are required to meet the commitments
of the 1996 Accord. Thus, it is not surprising that some farmers from
Irrigation District 026, unsatisfied with the terms of the agreement,
attempted to get an injunction against the accord, and, by extension, the
National Water Commission and other governmental authorities. In fact,
these farmers never signed the agreement in the first place. During the first
week of November 1997 the farmers were informed that they did not have
a case upon which to proceed. They, thus, were forced to follow the terms
of the accord as agreed upon by state and federal authorities, and only a
portion of the farmers.
The legal background behind this decision is very important, as are
the overall implications of this decision for water management in Mexico.
For this reason, the article will next provide a relatively detailed account of
the events that took place after the accord was signed on November 13,
1996. On February 28,1997, farmers of Irrigation District 026 requested that
the National Water Commission abolish all of the previous accords
pertaining to E Cuchillo Dam, including the November 13,1996; November 12,1990; and October 9,1989 agreements. The farmers insisted that the
validity of the 1952 Presidential Agreement be restored. On July eighth, the
Commission denied the petitions of the farmers and stated that they had
no case to pursue further. In the Commission's response, it explicitly stated
that the federal water laws of 1972 and 1992 gave the federal government
the authority to manage Mexico's waters, and thus automatically nullified
the effect of the 1952 Presidential Accord.
More specifically, in arguing their case, Irrigation District 026
farmers mentioned that the 1992 federal water law gave them rights to
operate their irrigation infrastructure. In response, the Commission
stressed the authority that this law gave the federal government to approve
irrigation plans for each agricultural season. Furthermore, by accepting the
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above mentioned accords, the farmers, in the Commission's view, had also
automatically resigned their rights to use water from the Rio San Juan
upstream from the Marte R G6mez Dam. In summary, they were told that
they knew about the legal framework granting the federal government the
authority to govern water allocation in Mexico, and that they had explicitly
consented to this authority by accepting the accords signed in 1989, 1990,
and 1996.
On July 28, several farmers from Irrigation District 026 obtained an
injunction from the Seventh State District Court, in Reynosa, Tamaulipas,
against the actions of the President of the Republic and other authorities.
A team of six well-respected lawyers, some of them with a national
reputation, represented the farmers. They argued that the 1952 Presidential
Agreement was still valid and that this enabled the farmers to use the Rio
San Juan waters stored in El Cuchillo Dam. They also argued that the 1989
Special Coordination Program that led to the Monterrey W Project was
invalid and therefore the construction and operation of the El Cuchillo
Dam was invalid. Next, the attorneys argued that the 1990 Coordination
Agreement for the Use of the Rio San Juan Basin, the 1996 Consensus
Minute, the orders to retain waters in the Marte R. G6mez Dam, and the
consequences derived from all previous acts were all invalid.
On August 11, 1997, the National Water Commission appealed the
decision of the state court that had ruled in favor of the farmers.' The
magistrates determined on October 20,1997, that the seventh State District
Court should not have accepted the farmers' demand. In their official
response, the court made it clear that the elements stated in the Commission's communication of July eighth, referred to above, should have been
enough for the lower court to rule against the complaint filed by the
farmers against the Commission. The court stressed that Article 27 of the
1972 Federal Water Law explicitly gave priority to domestic and urban
public water use over irrigation and industrial water use, that this principle
was re-stated in the 1992 Federal Water Law, and that the District Judge
must have taken this into consideration before granting the farmer's suit.
The court also stressed that the farmers lost out on the opportunity
to complain about the passage of the 1972 and 1992 Federal Water Laws,
as well as the agreements that led to construction of El Cuchillo Dam, and
the agreements attempting to resolve the El Cuchillo dispute.' On all these
grounds, the farmers, according to the court, did not have a case. As for

33. This information was obtained via written communication with the 2nd Tribunal of
the 19th Circuit, in Ciudad Victoria, the capital of Tamaulipas.
34. According to Mexican law, the farmers' suit against the water laws and the acts of the
Commission must have reached the courts in a maximum period of 15 days in order to be
heard.
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the 1952 Presidential Accord, the magistrates explained to the parties
involved that the accord was only valid during the time when there was no
governmental regulation over the waters now in conflict, a situation that
was since modified by changes in Mexican water legislation and the
acceptance by the farmers of the above mentioned agreements. In
conclusion, the court's recommendation was to consider the farmers' case
as dosed.
In the meantime, the new governor of Nuevo Le6n complied with
the provisions of the 1996 agreement and on November 14, 1997, released
95 Mm3 of water from E Cuchillo Dam to Irrigation District 026. The 1996
Agreement mandated that a study be conducted each November to
determine (a) the amount of water available in El Cuchillo Dam up to
October 31 of each year, and (b) the water demands of both Monterrey and
Tamaulipan farmers, in order to find out the amount of water that could be
released to Irrigation District 026 in Tamaulipas. Prior to this, both states
had opposing views as to the order of priorities in releasing water from El
Cuchillo Dam.
From November 9-15, the El Cuchillo controversy was on the front
page of El Norte, a leading daily newspaper in northern Mexico. During his
political campaign, Fernando Canales Clariond, from the opposition party
(the National Action Party [PAN], which is in opposition to the Revolutionary Institutional Party [PRI in Spanish]), had indicated his desire to
radically revise the 1996 agreement through which Nuevo Le6n is required
to send water to Tamaulipas from El Cuchillo Dam. It is interesting that
once in office, he too had to honor the 1996 agreement. The change of
government from one party to another, however, did not alter the terms of
the prior resolution in the 1996 agreement to the El Cuchillo dispute. Of
course, taking care of Monterrey's water needs was Governor Canales' first
priority, the farmers came second.
On November 11, 1997, the state legislature indicated that it was
considering asking Mexico's Supreme Court of Justice to abolish the 1952
Presidential Accord, on the grounds that the 1972 Federal Water Law had
invalidated this Accord. On November 13, 1997, Governor Canales
stressed the need to develop clear operating rules for the management of
El Cuchillo Dam, so that the two states could avoid an annual conflict. It is
striking, as discussed above, that this recommendation had already been
given several decades ago when El Cuchillo Dam was just a project.
Governor Canales also indicated that Tamaulipan farmers would only
receive excess water from El Cuchillo Dam. In Tamaulipas, however, the
view was that the water needs of Monterrey had been largely overesti-

35. Even though, as was indicated above, in this regard a judicial decision had already
been made. Communication, however, did not seem to flow quickly.
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mated in order to confuse the public and retain more water in the Dam for
its own use. It was further suggested that Monterrey wanted this extra
water for industrial purposes and that the National Water Commission had
been helping Nuevo Le6n to obtain the extra water.
Finally, in the first hours of November 14,1997,95 Mm of water
were transferred from El Cuchillo Dam to the Marte R. G6mez Dam
through the Rio San Juan for the benefit of Tamaulipan farmers. It was
estimated that 10 million cubic meters of water would be lost along the
way. High officials from the Commission also stated that the Commission,
and not Nuevo Le6n, would compensate Tamaulipan farmers for the water
they had not received. The amount of this compensation was estimated to
be 4 million pesos, and was due primarily to the fact that according to the
1996 agreement, the Commission was required to return 189 Mm 3 of
treated water to the, Marte R. G6mez Dam for the use of Tamaulipan
farmers. As a result, there were talks of establishing the Rio San Juan Basin
Council and of improving the 1996 agreement.'
From the Tamaulipan perspective, the state governor, Manuel
Cavazos Lerma, stressed that the state had benefited from the November
13,1996, agreement. Not only had water been released to Irrigation District
026, but monetary compensation for the farmers had also been secured, and
plans were under way to begin construction of Las Blancas Dam in 1998,
whose waters would then be allocated to Irrigation District 026. Las Blancas
Dam has recently been considered as a complementary project to supply
water for irrigation for northern Tamaulipas. It is expected that this project
could ease the pressures placed on the waters in El Cuchillo Dam.
However, as before, some farmers believed that this new agreement was against the interest of the region. The region, however, was
going to face economic and social crisis if it did not have enough water to
have a normal agricultural season. In their view, they would take their
fight to the Supreme Court of Justice to decide their constitutional
controversy against the Commission and the state government. As for the
farmers that did sign the 1996 agreement and who own about 32 thousand
hectares, or 46 percent of the district, the 95 Mm3 released from E Cuchillo
plus the 230 Mm3 retained in the Marte R. G6mez Dam would be enough
(with certain restrictions) to irrigate twice the district's total area.
At the end of 1997 there were plans in some parts of Irrigation
District 026 to shift from corn to sunflower production, due to the fact that
sunflower production takes less water. 7 It was becoming clear that the
water shortage was killing the economy of towns dedicated entirely to

36. It was officially recognized that the agreement had several vacuums, and that some
farmers had not signed it in the first place.
37.

See EL NORTE, Dec. 28,1997, at 6A.
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agriculture. Furthermore, banks began refusing to finance new agricultural
production alternatives. By February 1998 the resentment of the farmers
that did not sign the 1996 agreement was still lingering in the air. These
farmers rejected the monetary compensation that was offered to them on
November 13, 1997. They said this compensation was too little, and that
there was a conceptual misunderstanding regarding the entire controversy.
The farmers wanted to be compensated for water retained in El Cuchillo
Dam and not for the insufficiently treated water returned from Monterrey
through the Marte R.G6mez Dam. They went even further by saying that
compensation for foregone water was not the solution. In their words, their
business was food production, and it is with water and not with money
that this could be done.' Even though the Commission announced that it
would increase the compensation amount by 11 million pesos (from 4
million pesos to 15 million pesos), 54 percent of the farmers continued to
oppose the gesture?9
The issue of availability of water versus the need for water, in
particular, has been fiercely debated by both sides. Basically, Monterrey
does not want to sign an obligation to release a yearly fixed amount of
water to Tamaulipas, given the uncertainty of rain in the region. In the
words of the former governor of Nuevo Le6n, Benjamin Clariond Reyes
Retana,
We cannot assure this release, without knowing if there is
going to be a good rainy season. If we said yes and then there
is no rain, the inhabitants of the metropolitan area are going
to suffer. Our calculations, however, would indicate a
minimum existence of 315 million cubic meters, above which
all water could be sent to Tamaulipas. We could not proceed
otherwise. This is what we had agreed to in 1996, 1 do not
know why they"-induding the present Nuevo Le6n's
governor-are asking for water we could not promise.'0
Of course the other side does not share this view. This viewpoint
argues that the water stored in El Cuchillo Dam is not the only source of
water for Monterrey. Monterrey also has access to groundwater, and
surface water from La Boca Dam and the Cerro Prieto Dam. Furthermore,

38. See EL NORTE, Feb. 12,1998, at 7A.

39. The Commission announced the payment of 235 pesos for each one of the 77
thousand hectares, as a compensation for the 90 Mm of treated water that never got to Marte

R. G6mez Dam. It is interesting that the farmers that disagree with the dealings between the
two state governments and the Commission acknowledge that those farmers that signed the
1996 agreement gave up their rights contained in the 1952 Presidential Accord. Note that this

is part of the argument used by the Ciudad Victoria court in rejecting the district's claim over
El Cuchillo's waters. See EL NORT, Feb. 14,1998, at 6A.
40. Personal communication to the author.
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this viewpoint also believes that Monterrey should be held accountable for
its inefficient and wasteful use of water as it enters into the Monterrey
system, due to leaks in the infrastructure that conducts the water into and
within the city, and outright waste of the resource. This perspective
believes that Monterrey should only take the amount of water it needs
from El Cuchillo Dam to complement the water necessary for human
consumption, of course assuming that "the house has been put in order."
It is clear that the two concepts of excess water (Nuevo Le6n) and
complementary water (Tamaulipas) are different and clash with one another.
Furthermore, some people in Tamaulipas argue that they were convinced
to sign the 1990 agreement under the promise that Nuevo Le6n would use
the excess water from the Marte R. G6mez Dam, water which previously
had made its way into the Gulf of Mexico.
As mentioned in the introduction to this contribution, the above
story could be better understood if it is framed within a more comprehensive context. Out of the several issues that could be included, two of them
are central in understanding the conflict- the long-standing nature of the El
Cuchillo Dam project, and the technical background that provided some
warnings about its construction. To a large extent "the problems" with El
Cuchillo Dam were born with the project. This was further shown through
the explanation of the events that took place in 1997.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1. The occurrence of the present drought affecting northeastern
Mexico brought about a complex set of affairs which otherwise may have
gone on unnoticed, could have been postponed or occurred on a lesser
scale. One such affair is the inter-state conflict between Tamaulipas and
Nuevo Le6n, due to the interregional transfer of water from El Cuchillo
Dam.
2. With the increasingdemand for water and the questionable nature of
an adequatewater supply in terms of quantity and quality, it seems plausible that
conflicts over water use will escalate. Within this framework, access to water
will likely be seen as a regional comparative advantage and no longer as a
free good. In the absence of proper handling, it is also very likely that inter
and intra-regional conflicts will continue to emerge and will become more
intense. This would have unfortunate and profound impacts on the socioeconomic futures of Mexico's regions.
3. El Cuchillo has been a long-standingproject to supply drinkingwater
to Monterrey. In fact, as was discussed, work had already begun to build
this dam. The striking thing is that for several of these studies, El Cuchillo
Dam was not an appealing project. A careful analysis of these studies
would suggest that to a large extent the conflicts with El Cuchillo Dam had
been born with the project itself.
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4. The Rio San Juan Basin, where the conflict is set, is a matter of
national interest as opposed to a mere regional dispute over water rights.
Monterrey and northern Tamaulipas maintain national spotlights.
Monterrey is a booming national manufacturing and service center that
receives the second largest inflow of foreign direct investment (just second
to the Federal District) that has entered into Mexico from 1989-1995.
Monterrey is also the third most populated metropolitan area in the
country (around 3 million people). On the other hand, northern
Tamaulipas in general, and Irrigation District 026 in particular, are very
important economic and agricultural regions. Most road trade between
Mexico and the United States passes through Nuevo Laredo. Apart from
this city, Matamoros and Reynosa are also among the most relevant
maquiladoracenters in Mexico. By linking these two regions, the conflict
over El CuchiUo Dam is not just a simple local dispute. Furthermore, since
the population of the Lower Rio Bravo depends upon this river for
domestic water consumption, and the Mexican government has asked
Texas for a water loan intended for agricultural purposes, the conflict's
influence reaches the binationalsphere.
5. The droughtin generaland the El Cuchilloaffair in particularrevealed
shortcomings in water management, especially regardingthe legal and institutionalframework.This conflict dearly shows that part of the problem lies in
the interpretation of the law, according to the different interests of the
actors involved. This issue does not only deal with an appropriate
valuation of water among users, but it also underlines the legal battle
regarding the attributions of the federal, state, and local levels. The 1990
agreement created a complex set of commitments which, at the end of the
day, has helped to trigger the larger conflict. One of these commitments
was the transfer of treated water from Monterrey to the Marte R. G6mez
Dam that could not be fulfilled largely due to the number of illegal intakes
along the Pesqueria and San Juan Rivers. If the 1990 agreement had been
completely honored, perhaps the 1995/97 dispute would never have
happened. Thus, enforcement and responsibility in fulfilling promises and
accords are crucial matters in water management.
6. The conflict was heavily politicized, andfuelled by the media, which
in several cases was more interested in sensationalistnews rather than in the
substance of the issues under consideration.' This implies that academic research
41. In addition to the daily press coverage, see the story run by the popular magazine
Epoc, supra note 16, at 8, the cover of which depicted the governors from Nuevo Le6n and
Tamaulipas holding a little water pistol directed against each other with a big heading stating;
The Water War-Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas: Water and Politics. A common argument stated
by Nuevo Le6n was that the state had financed the construction of El Cuchillo. Those
subscribing to this argument maintained that it made no sense at all to incur these expenses
if the water in the Dam was going to be owned by the federal government. A second popular
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on these issues has been seriouslyundermined.Getting datafrom government and
private sources during the El Cuchillo controversy has been extremely difficult.
Government water reports, that in other circumstances would have been less
difcult tofind, became extremely difficult to obtain. Access to most government
officials was also seriously undermined. Therefore, the undertaking of academic
research has been greatly affected by the emergence and development of the
conflict.
7. This particularconflict also illustratesthe need to reinforce a demandside approach to water management. So far, increasing water demand has
usually been met with increasing the water supply. This route has proven
to be extremely costly, not only in financial terms but also in social and
political terms. Increasing efficiency in the use of water that is already in
the system, be it domestic, industrial, or agricultural, is a must prior to
bringing in more water from other distant places. The role of both
technology, in the urban economy and in agriculture, and the market
system are seen in this context. Prior to the publicity of El Cuchillo,
Monterrey's future water needs considered water transfers from Vicente
Guerrero Dam, also located in Tamaulipas (ChAvez Gutierrez, 1995), and
even included plans to desalinate water from the Gulf of Mexico. Realistically speaking, however, these alternatives, even if they somehow passed
the test of economics and technology, are politically unfeasible.
Furthermore, if all these constraints on supplies could be dealt
with, the approach would have serious, conceptual limitations. As it has
been pointed out by Frederick,
As water development expands and the resource becomes
scarcer, the construction and management of water projects
become less a means of adding to aggregate supplies and
more a means of allocating supplies among alternative
sectors such as irrigation, households, industry, and various
instream uses. That is, a water project becomes a form of
demand management. In contrast to the constraints on
supplies, demands for both instream and withdrawal uses of
water tend to rise with economic and population growth.
argument is that, since there are 3 million people in Monterrey versus 2,500 persons in
Tamaulipas, the waters from El Cuchillo should benefit 1,200 times more people in Monterrey
than in Tamaulipas. Of course, this argument was severely undermined when it was
determined that the federal government, and not Nuevo Le6n, had paid for construction of
the Dam. Furthermore, the argument that only 2,500 farmers are affected by El Cuchillo Dam
is very simplistic. According to conservative estimates from the Tamaulipas side, at least
200,000 people indirectly depend on the ability of this agricultural region to produce crops.
As an example of these one-sided and ill-informed arguments, and in addition to the review
of the local press done by Octavio ChAvez, see the following article in theNuevo Le6n local
student magazine: Consejo Juvenil de Aciones Legislativas, El Cuchillo: El Naufragio de la
Legalidad, Deliberacidn Y Anhlisis, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 18-20.
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When demand grows faster than supply, demand management is required to bring water use into balance with
supply.,
8. Both Nuevo Le6n and Tamaulipas lost with the El Cuchillo Dam
project. Monterrey lost because it had to incur severe debt to finance the
infrastructure of the project, but does not have full control over the water
contained in El Cuchillo Dam. Tamaulipas lost because it has no control
over either the current amount or the quality of water it can use. Now it has
to negotiate with the federal government and Nuevo Le6n to use water that
it used freely before (of course, assuming the existence of "excess" flows).
9. However, there is anotherviewfor which the conflict did bring about
"good news." One of them is the increasingawareness of water scarcityand the
correspondingmeasures that have been taken to remedy this problem. Overall, El
Cuchillo Dam means more water for the region and for Mexico in general.
Whether there is an inter and intra-regional appropriate and efficient
distribution of these waters is a different story altogether. In fact,
Tamaulipas can now rely less on the rain to feed its crops and has the
opportunity to access a relatively secure source of treated water from the
Marte R. G6mez Dam, in addition to direct transfers of water from El
Cuchillo Dam. This is dependent, however, on Monterrey fulfilling its
obligation to return its treated wastewater to the Marte R.G6mez Dam, in
return for fresh water taken from El Cuchillo Dam. This is a matter of
further concern and consideration. On the other hand, Monterrey now has
access to water 24 hours a day and does not have to ration its water supply
as it did in the past. Without the waters from the El Cuchillo Dam,
however, Monterrey will again experience an automatic water deficit. For
a region like this one, where water scarcity is the name of the game, water
management really becomes drought management, and hence the
fundamental importance of demand-driven strategies.
10. Something that is less likely to be debated is the lack of vision in
formulatingthe agreement that led to the construction of El Cuchillo Dam. Most
problems encountered with this project could have been anticipated and
avoided. The impending controversy was largely an announced story.4
The wording itself is a major problem. At the end of the day the whole
problem can be said to boil down to the interpretation of a simple word or

42.

K.D. FREDERC, WORLDBANI, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 189, BALANCING

WATER DEMANDS WITH SUPPLIES-THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT IN A WORLD OF INCREASING

SCARCITY vii (1993).
43. It was obvious that a problem was in the air, just waiting to explode. For instance, an

article by the author explicitly mentioned this, one year before the conflict was in the press.
Ismael Aguilar Barajas, Monterrey: Formasde Integracid6n a La Economfa del Sur de los Estados
Unidos, 45 COMERcIO EXTERIOR, 409,412 (May, 1995).
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comma. Monterrey, but not necessarily Nuevo Le6n as a whole, sees to the
left, whereas Tamaulipas sees to the right. The agreement states that water
from El CuchiUlo is for human consumption for Monterrey, preserving,at the
same time (my emphasis), that the needs of Irrigation District 026 are
satisfied. Furthermore, Monterrey bases its claim upon National Water
Law, which gives human consumption the highest priority. Tamaulipas
simply refers to the meaning of the word "preserving." To a large extent
semantics has a role in drafting legal and normative documents. The
lessons to be learned from this issue, and considered important in
preventing future disputes, are straightforward.
11. Growing population and economic growth increasethe demandfor
water. Ifthere is less water to supply both in quantitativeand qualitativeterms,
then simple math shows us that there is a problem. For instance, the forecasted
population for Monterrey is about 4 million people in the year 2010, 5
million in 2020, and 6 million in 2030. This figure is twice the population
that existed in Monterrey in 1995. The economy of the metropolitan area is
also expected to expand. The combination of these two issues will certainly
put a great deal of pressure on Monterrey's water supply. It seems that
given the current and future limited water sources, Nuevo Le6n cannot
afford the luxury of not having access to the water that it already receives
from El Cuchillo Dam. And of course, this adverse outlook takes place in
a semi-arid region where the occurrence of droughts is normal. Thus, part
of the problem is the presence of droughts plus high economic and
population growth.
12. The emergence of the drought caught Mexican institutions
unpreparedto deal with the resultingwater shortage.It is clear that there were no
governmental plans to cope with these kinds of events, and that it was very
unlikely that a single agency could address the wide variety ofproblems derived
from the occurrence of droughts. In other words, tackling these problems
would necessitate a more orchestrated response. Short-term crisis
management very often has replaced long-term planning. Although this is
understandable, partly as a response to the day-to-day difficulties, it has
proven to be extremely costly, not only in financial terms, but also in social,
environmental, and political ones. Time itself has a value, if only because
the wrong strategies consume time that otherwise could well be used to
deploy more appropriate problem-solving techniques.
13. It would seem likely that the conflict will continue until a definitive,
long-term, win-win resolution is reached.There is the firm belief that this is
possible. Monterrey and its metropolitan area cannot afford not to have
access to the water stored in El Cuchillo Dam. This requires certainty in the
long run and must pass through a final and win-win arrangement with
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Irrigation District 026, as had been recognized well before the conflict
reached the media."
14 The following could be taken as overall conclusions:
A. The conflict over El Cuchillo Dam is framed within the context
of the severe drought the region has been experiencing. This drought,
which has caused many problems, is far from the most severe registered
since the 1950s. This means that a more severe drought could cause more
devastating effects. This is particularly worrisome, especially since the
demand for water will only increase and the supply of water will decrease.
The situation is made worse because there are no appropriate programs
developed out of long-term contemplation and planning. That is, action is
needed not only as a response to crisis. In the absence of appropriate
planning actions, it is natural that increasing difficulties will result and
continued inter-regional transfers of water from distant places will have to
continue.
B. The El Cuchillo Dam project was bound for conflict. Most
studies indicated that on technical and economic grounds, the project was
not worth pursuing.
C. It is of paramount importance to gain a better understanding of
the complexities involved. A failure to do this very often has resulted in
partial or inadequate perceptions of what the problems really are.
D. It is also of great relevance to strengthen the institutional setting
upon which the conflict has evolved. As stated above, no single institution
could be capable of, on its own, handling the crisis originated by droughts
in general and this interstate conflict in particular. The El Cuchillo affair
demonstrated the ineffective role of the Rio Bravo Basin Council, established in 1994, to place this decision-making necessity into a strengthened
institutional framework, where stakeholders would have a greater voice in
policy formulation.
E. The above point also supports the urgency of greater cooperation from the binational level to the local level. It is through cooperation
rather than competition that shared water resources will be utilized best.
F. In the end, it is crucial to foster inter and intra-regional
systematic views of water management. Water systems must work together
more comprehensively. The way that regional waters will be utilized the
best is not just to find ways to supply more water, but also to find ways to
manage water demand. The room for market-based instruments is large
and is beginning to develop. However, this move will need to take a closer
look at technical, economic, social, environmental, legal, and political

44. See id.; J. ChAvez Gutierrez, El Sistema Hidrdulico, in ATLAS DE MONERR
215 (G.
Garza ed., 1995) (Monterrey, N.L, & Mexdco, D.F., Gobierno del Estado de Nuevo Le6n,

Universidad Aut6noma de Nuevo Le6n, and E Colegio de Mxico).
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perspectives. It does not seem that this has been the case so far. Several of
the current policy recommendations that are usually heard of have been
proposed for many years, like the call for more comprehensive and dearer
water management policies. 0

45. See, eg., COmIsION DEL PLAN NACIONAL HIDRAULiCO, SECRETARIA DE AGRICULTURA Y
R-RSOS HIDRAUUCOS, INTIGRACION DEL PLAN HIDRAUUCo DE LA CUENCA DEL RIo BRAVO
(1982) (M dco, D.P.) (federal govemmt report prepared for the entire Rio Bravo Basin). This

report contained the following conclusions and recommendations: (1) The basin has scarce
water resources compared with demand; (2) the projections of this demand to the year 2000
would suggest the need for a more careful water management approach; (3) the incorporation
of new agricultural land should be taken with extreme care, in the light of the pressure this
act has on water supply; (4) the Falc6n and Marte R. G6mez Dams should be operated as a
system; (5) the irrigation districts should be rehabilitated so that their overall efficiency is
increased; (6) the income of the rural population needs to be increased in order to decrease
migration of the ruralpopulation to urban centers; (7) industrial projects should be planned

in accordance with water availabality and the incentives to re-use water should be
encouraged; (8) the pricing system should be developed so that funds from the federal
government are utilized efficiently and put to their best use (if this is not done it could, in
turn, affect the proper operation and maintenance of the water infrastructure); and (9) the
intemational water treaty between Mexico and the United States should be considered in all
future water management plans.
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